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COMPETITION AS POLICY REFORM: THE USE OF VIGOROUS 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, MARKET-GOVERNANCE RULES, 
AND INCENTIVES IN HEALTH CARE 
EMILIO VARANINI* 
ABSTRACT 
In health care, the increase in market concentration on both the insurer side 
and the provider side has led to insurers and providers acquiring market power. 
Insurers and providers, in turn, have used that market power to charge higher 
prices to employers providing employees with medical care without 
corresponding increases in the quality of that care. Responding more generally 
to the increase in market concentration in many industries in the United States 
with a range of inimical effects for the nation’s economy, the Obama 
Administration suggested a range of policy solutions that this article groups 
under the term “Competition as Policy Reform.” These solutions included the 
use of vigorous antitrust enforcement to restore competition, the use of market 
incentives to stimulate existing competition, and the promulgation of market-
governance rules to jumpstart new competition. This article explores in detail 
whether and how competition as policy reform can be instituted in health care. 
It first discusses what vigorous antitrust enforcement can and cannot do to 
combat the use of market power by health care actors in more concentrated 
markets. Recognizing that the enforcement of antitrust law can, at best, restore 
the status quo ante in terms of competition in a market victimized by anti-
competitive conduct, this article also explores two other solutions: (1) the use of 
market incentives to stimulate competition and (2) the promulgation of market-
governance rules to jumpstart competition. This article finds that competition as 
policy reform can be instituted in health care as an alternative to other proposed 
policy solutions, such as applying the regulated utility model. Ultimately, it also 
finds that the individual states—as laboratories for experimentation in our 
federalist system—can play a key role in the endeavor to use competition as 
policy reform in health care. 
  
 
* Senior attorney in state public service in California. The author thanks Robert Berenson, Kathleen 
Foote, Thomas Greaney, and Bruce Hinze for their insights. This law review article sets out the 
personal views of the author only and so should not be ascribed to the California Attorney General’s 
Office, any other state attorney general’s office, or any other organization or individual. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Competition as policy reform starts with issues involving the exercise of 
market power—and in its extreme form, monopoly power—excepting covert 
price-fixing conspiracies. Market power is the ability to charge a price higher 
than the one prevailing in competitive markets.1 As it consists in effect of the 
power to control prices or exclude competition, it is interchangeable with 
monopoly power.2 A significant driving escalator of costs in our health care 
system is the acquisition of market power or monopoly power by participants in 
that system—be they health care providers such as hospital systems, or insurance 
companies.3 This matches more generalized concerns that increases in market 
concentration—an indicator of possible market power or monopoly power—in 
many industries since the Great Recession of 2008 may be causing strong 
negative impacts on the national economy involving less consumer choice, less 
quality, and higher prices, as well as higher profits that are not reinvested into 
higher wages or into additional research and development.4  
 
 1. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992); see 
also, e.g., In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 863 (2015); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984); PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 109 (3d ed. 2007). 
 2. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 
76 GEORGETOWN L.J. 241, 247 (1987). The case law takes a similar view as to market power and 
monopoly power. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d at 863. Other cases and sources, however, 
distinguish between market power and monopoly power, finding that the latter applies only when 
a firm is restrained by its own costs, i.e., any fringe competitors left in the market do not appreciably 
impact the market power. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 
2007); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION 
LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 19–20 (2d ed. 2012) (Monopoly power requires “‘something 
greater’ than a finding of market power.”). 
 3. Several sources discuss this issue of health care costs as being a serious problem in 
delivering health care in the United States as well as attempts that are under way to bring reform to 
health care pricing, such as by switching from fee-for-service pricing to risk-based pricing. See, 
e.g., Kenneth W. Field & Douglas E. Litvack, Health Care Merger Analysis in the Era of Payment 
Reform, Competition, J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. STATE BAR CAL., Fall 2015, at 42, 44–
47. For a discussion on how the increase in health care costs may be attributed in part to market 
concentration, see, for example, Brief of Amicus Curiae of the States of Cal. et al. at 8-12, Saint 
Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 
2014) (No. 14-35173) (collecting studies from California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut on the 
threat to health care posed by increased costs and the role of market concentration in increasing 
those costs). 
 4. See, e.g., Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power, COUNCIL OF ECON. 
ADVISERS 7, 14 (Apr. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/ 
20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf; see also, e.g., Too Much of a Good Thing, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2016, at 21–22. What constitutes a concentrated market and how much the 
degree of market concentration reflects a diminution of competition as opposed to other factors 
such as scale economies may require a more discerning analysis. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Hogans Lovells, Hong Kong: Does the U.S. Economy 
Lack Competition, and If So What To Do About It? 2, 5–6 (June 1, 2016), https://www.ftc. 
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As measured by a number of studies, such as those concerning the regions 
established by the California Legislature for individuals5 and small employers,6 
to purchase health insurance under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA),7 health care providers (e.g., hospitals and physician medical groups) 
who acquire market power are able to increase the prices charged to health 
insurers.8 Those prices are in turn passed through: first, directly as an increase 
in costs for self-insured employers (“self-insureds”—those who assume the 
financial risk for their employees’ use of medical providers and then contract 
with insurers for administrative services and the “rent” of those insurers’ 
provider networks)9 and second, indirectly to individuals and fully insured 
businesses in the form of higher premiums and cost-sharing obligations.10 This 
increase in prices has not led to an increase in the quality of medical care,11 but 
 
gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/952273/160601doesuseconomylackcomp.pdf. 
However, a more discerning analysis may lead to the concluision that the increase in market 
concentration corresponds to increased prices and not to increased efficiencies such as economies 
of scale. See BRUCE A. BLONIGEN & JUSTIN R. PIERCE, DIVS. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS & 
MONETARY AFFAIRS, EVIDENCE FOR THE EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON MARKET POWER AND 
EFFICIENCY (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016082pap.pdf. 
 5. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1399.855 (2013); see also CAL. INS. CODE § 10965.9 
(2013). 
 6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.512 (2013); see also CAL. INS. CODE § 
10753.14 (2013). 
 7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
 8. See, e.g., Richard M. Scheffler et al., Covered California: The Impact of Provider and 
Health Plan Market Power on Premiums, 40 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 1179, 1184–87 (2015); 
T. Scott Thompson, ACA Exchange Premiums and Hospital Concentration in California, 
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., June 2015, at 27–28, 33. 
 9. See David Dranove, The Anthem-Cigna Merger: A Post-Mortem, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170905.061802/full/ (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2017). Self-insured employers constitute a quite sizeable portion of the employment picture 
in the states. See, e.g., STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CTR., STATE-LEVEL TRENDS IN 
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 10 (2013), 
http://www.shadac.org/sites/default/files/Old_files/shadac/publications/ESI_Report_2013.pdf 
(noting that in 2011, almost sixty percent of employers, with more than fifty employees, offered 
self-insured coverage). 
 10. See Scheffler et al., supra note 8 at 1189, 1192. 
 11. See, e.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S POLICY 100, 245 (2015); see also, e.g., N.Y. STATE HEALTH 
FOUND., WHY ARE HOSPITAL PRICES DIFFERENT? AN EXAMINATION OF NEW YORK HOSPITAL 
REIMBURSEMENT 8 (Dec. 2016), https://nyshealthfoundation.org/uploads/resources/an-examina 
tion-of-new-york-hospital-reimbursement-dec-2016.pdf; Martin Gaynor et al., The Industrial 
Organization of Health Care Markets 53 J. ECON. LITERATURE 235, 247 (2015). (“[B]oth mortality 
and expenditures are lower in less concentrated markets . . . .”); Bob Kocher & Ezekiel J. 
Emmanuel, Overcoming the Pricing Power of Hospitals, 308 JAMA 1203, 1214 (2012) (“Moving 
from [a model of] hospitals [as] price setters to a market in which patient demand drives hospital 
prices and quality improvement” requires “systems that [concentrate on] outcomes as opposed to 
activity, [and that] are focused on service and quality” as opposed to volume.). 
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it has slowed wage increases as employers and their workers have to bargain for 
the coverage of these increased costs.12 
However, the increase in costs accompanying the acquisition of market 
power in the health care industry is not limited to health care providers. The 
market concentration of insurers has also resulted in premium increases—
though California’s use of an active purchaser model for selecting insurance 
products for individuals and small businesses who shop for health care plans on 
its exchange has in the current market appeared to have acted as a 
counterweight.13 
These developments all raise the question of how to address issues arising 
from the gain or maintenance of market power flowing from market 
concentration in health care. Is that the job of antitrust law exclusively? Or is 
there a role to play for other options working in tandem with antitrust law to, in 
effect, use competition norms as the spearhead of policy reform? This article 
answers these questions by stating that there is a role in implementing 
competition as policy for vigorous antitrust law enforcement, for incentives to 
increase competition, and for market-governance rules that address the gaps in 
vigorous antitrust enforcement and in the use of incentives.  
This article then concludes with thoughts on the often-overlooked role of the 
states in furthering competition in health care markets as the reason why states 
need to consider the use of competition as policy reform.14 Given that providing 
health care services amounts to one-sixth of the nation’s economic output,15 the 
answers to the questions posed above assume a special importance in terms of 
addressing the more general questions involved in remedying inimical effects 
from market concentration arising from 2008. And ultimately, how these 
questions can be answered will determine whether competition itself as policy 
 
 12. See MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., MAKING HEALTH CARE MARKETS 
WORK: COMPETITION POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE, ACTIONABLE POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CONGRESS, AND THE STATES 3 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2017/04/gaynor-et-al-final-report-v11.pdf. 
 13. See Richard M. Scheffler et al., Differing Impacts of Market Concentration on Affordable 
Care Act Marketplace Premiums, 35 HEALTH AFF. 880, 881, 883–87 (2016); see also Health 
Insurance Industry Consolidation: What Do We Know from the Past, Is It Relevant in Light of the 
ACA, and What Should We Ask?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Competition Pol’y, & Consumer Rights, 114th Cong. 12 (2015) (testimony of Leemore 
S. Dafny); Leemore Dafny et al., Paying a Premium on your Premium: Consolidation in the U.S. 
Health Ins. Industry 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 15434, 2009), 
http://www.bu.edu/sph/files/2010/10/Dafny-Duggan-Ramanarayanan.pdf. 
 14. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae of the States of Cal. et al., supra note 3, at 5. 
 15. Natalie Jones, Health Care in America: Follow the Money, NPR (Mar. 29, 2012, 4:58 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2012/03/19/148932689/health-care-in-america-follow-
the-money (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
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reform is a superior alternative to other non-competition based options, such as 
a regulated utility model.16 
II.  BACKGROUND ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND REMEDIES 
To understand the role that vigorous antitrust enforcement can play in 
executing competition as policy, it is necessary to begin by noting that the scope 
of antitrust law and the reach of the remedies that it provides rests on two issues: 
(1) the conduct at issue, and (2) whether a firm has market power (absent certain 
narrow exceptions). Because the analysis of market power under antitrust law, 
in turn, rests on economics, including specific studies and models relating to 
health care, this section will first discuss how economics has contributed to the 
assessment of antitrust issues. Next, it will discuss how economics has informed 
the definition of markets and hence the assessment of market power in the health 
care context. Then this section will discuss how the antitrust laws classify 
business conduct into one of three categories: (1) joint conduct, (2) unilateral 
conduct, or (3) mergers and acquisitions. 
A. Use of Economics in Antitrust Law 
The United States (U.S.) Supreme Court has expressly recognized that 
developments in economic thinking can lead to changes in antitrust analysis.17 
The California Supreme Court has articulated the presumptions to be applied to 
the review of pharmaceutical settlements between brand drug manufacturers and 
generic drug manufacturers based on economics.18 Thus, to understand how the 
courts determine the metes and bounds of health care markets, the touchstone 
for assessing market power, it is helpful to start with the economic studies and 
analysis of these markets to which courts increasingly refer. 
B. Economic Measurement of the Metes and Bounds of Health Care Provider 
and Insurer Markets and the Implications for Prices 
In looking at why challenges by federal and state antitrust authorities to 
horizontal provider acquisitions generally failed through the early 2000s—
erroneously so as it led to court approval of acquisitions that caused anti-
competitive effects19—health care economists developed the so-called two-
 
 16. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 
85, 129 (2015); see also Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win 
Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH 
AFF. 973, 979 (2012). 
 17. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2404 (2015) (The U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that it has “felt relatively free to revise [its] legal analysis as economic understanding evolves 
and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”). 
 18. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 850–51 (Cal. 2015). 
 19. See, e.g., Cory S. Capps, From Rockford to Joplin and Back Again: The Impact of 
Economics on Hospital Merger Enforcement, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 443, 460 (2014); see also, e.g., 
Steven Tenn, The Price Effects Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction, 
18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 65, 69–70 (2011). 
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stage model of health care markets. The first stage—and the key one for 
purposes of determining market shares—involved providers bargaining with 
insurers for inclusion in those insurers’ networks at a set price.20 Once an 
employer selected an insurer, the second stage would involve the employees of 
that employer choosing an individual provider21—a choice that would largely 
be based on non-price factors such as referrals, word-of-mouth, and reputation, 
though employers and insurers are making efforts to change that dynamic.22 
Because choices made in the second stage were based on non-price factors, the 
second stage would not play the same role as the first stage in assessing the scope 
of relevant health care markets from the perspective of antitrust law.23 
As far as the markets for large employers directly purchasing insurance or 
self-insured employers “renting” a network (with the insurer serving as an 
Administrative Service Organization (ASO)) may be concerned, this two-stage 
model set out how those networks had to be broad and deep enough to be 
attractive to the employees of these large companies. This means that if a 
network was missing key components necessary to making these networks 
attractive to such employees, such as the existence of providers for most kinds 
of medical care close to where employees live and work,24 the existence of such 
holes would, all else being equal, make that network less desirable. Accordingly, 
as providers grow by acquiring hospitals (“horizontal acquisitions”) and setting 
up affiliations with physician groups that can direct referrals to those hospitals 
(“vertical acquisitions”),25 they can expand these network holes, enhancing their 
bargaining leverage vis-a-vis insurers even if the market share of an individual 
hospital or an individual physician group of that provider group was otherwise 
modest.26  
 
 20. See Capps, supra note 19, at 460. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 
671, 682 (2000). 
 23. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 
775, 784 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 
327, 342 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 193 (D.D.C. 2017), 
aff’d, 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). A good synopsis of the two-stage model, based on evidence 
and economic analysis submitted by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in such cases as the St. 
Luke’s case, can be found at Field & Litvack, supra note 3, at 43–44. 
 24. That employees demand the availability of health care services close to where they live 
and work has been recognized in the case law. See, e.g., Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d at 
342; Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., 778 F.3d at 784–85; In the Matter of Evanston 
Northwestern Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315, at 10 (F.T.C. 2007); Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 
3d at 204. 
 25. See Roger D. Blair et al., Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2016). 
 26. See, e.g., UAS Mgmt., Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hosp., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 81, 90 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008); see also, e.g., In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 
9315, at 57–58 (F.T.C. 2007). 
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Applying this two-stage model, economists have found the following: (1) 
horizontal acquisitions can and have increased market power—leading to 
increases in prices charged to insurers even if there is a significant group of 
employees who travel far for medical care;27 and (2) vertical acquisitions can 
and have increased market power—leading to increases in prices due to referral 
effects, e.g., the increased steering of patients by a formerly independent 
physician group to an acquiring hospital or hospital system at the expense of 
competing hospitals.28 Furthermore, using this model, there are studies finding 
that cross-market provider acquisitions, e.g., health care provider systems in a 
given county entering a new market in a different county by acquiring a provider, 
can result in price increases.29 
As far as insurers are concerned, there are two aspects to the economic 
analysis of their health insurer markets. One aspect is calculating the insurers’ 
shares of the markets for the sale of products for fully insured employers and 
self-insureds (whether those products are viewed as being sold in one market or 
in two markets) to assess market power. The determination of the metes and 
bounds of this aspect of insurer markets is influenced by three factors: (1) the 
 
 27. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 470–72, 
475 n.5 (7th Cir. 2016); Brief of Amicus Curiae Submitted by 33 Economists in Support of the 
FTC and State of Illinois at 7, 9, 12, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 
F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2016); Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d at 343; Consent Brief of Amici 
Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants Urging Reversal at 6, 8–9, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n et al. v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr. et al., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 1:15-
cv-02362); St. Alphonsus Medical Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., 778 F.3d at 784 n.10; Motion for Leave to File 
Brief of Amici Curiae Economics Professors at 7, St. Alphonsus Medical Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. 
Luke’s Health System, Ltd. et al., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 1:12-cv-00560-BLW); 
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 749 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2014) (relying on 
insurer testimony as to the two-stage market). 
 28. E.g., Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician 
Practices Is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 HEALTH AFF. 756, 756–57 (2014); 
Julie A. Carlson et al., Economics at the FTC: Physician Acquisitions, Standard Essential Patents, 
and Accuracy of Credit Reporting, SPRINGER 303, 306, 311–12 (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.ftc. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/economics-ftc-physician-acquisitions-standard-essential 
-patents-accuracy-credit-reporting/carlsonetal-physicianacquisitions2013.pdf; Ann S. O’Malley et 
al., Rising Hospital Employment of Physicians: Better Quality, Higher Costs?, ISSUE BRIEF, Aug. 
2011, at 1–2, 4 (increasing hospital employment of physicians in turn leads to an increase in 
referrals that can raise costs without increasing quality absent reform of the payment structure); 
Robert S. Huckman, Hospital Integration and Vertical Consolidation: An Analysis of Acquisitions 
in New York State, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 58, 77 (2006). 
 29. See Leemore Dafny et al., The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital Mergers 25 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22106, 2017); Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, 
Hospital Systems and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Out-of-Market Acquisitions, 48 RAND J. 
ECON. 579, 581 (2017); Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Diagnosing Hospital System 
Bargaining Power in Managed Care Networks, 7 AM. ECON. J. 243, 244 (2014); Gregory S. Vistnes 
& Yianis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: A Holistic Approach, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 
259 (2013). 
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specialization of insurers, with some insurers gearing their products for the 
individual and small group market, and others designing their products for large 
group and ASO markets;30 (2) the role of state agencies as gatekeepers regarding 
entry into their insurance markets, which can impose general requirements such 
as financial stability as well as specific requirements that depend on the nature 
of the market in question;31 and (3) whether certain insurers will never be able 
to obtain anything more than a slice of business in a given market because of 
limitations in demand for their particular business model, with Kaiser—an 
integrated, closed system that provides insurance and has its own providers—
being such an example in California.32 Studies have found that the acquisition 
of market share by insurers in employer markets (large group and ASO) has led 
to higher prices for employers.33  
Another aspect in market analysis is calculating the market share of an 
insurer purchase of health care services from health care providers to assess its 
market power vis-a-vis those providers. The determination of the scope of such 
upstream or supply markets focuses on how an anti-competitive reduction in 
upstream prices can reduce downstream services, e.g., reducing the quality or 
output of medical care or limiting provider availability.34 For this reason, the 
economic literature refers to this set of circumstances as monopsony to 
distinguish it from the more familiar monopoly situation.35  
Cases do exist in which insurers were seen to have monopsony power.36 
Studies have found that insurers can exercise monopsony power.37 Indeed, while 
a monopsony analysis focuses on the negative incentives for upstream markets 
by an anti-competitive reduction in price, to the extent that providers perceive 
 
 30. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 188, 194 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 855 
F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). More broadly, the determination of the relevant market for health care 
purposes can either focus on the services being provided such as acute in-patient services or primary 
care physician services, see Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc., 778 F.3d at 784–85; Cal. v. 
Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2001), or on the nature of the payors 
who are receiving or furnishing services, see, e.g., Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 194; In the 
Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315, at 55 (F.T.C. 2007). 
 31. See, e.g., Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 187–88. 
 32. See id. at 205. 
 33. See, e.g., Scheffler et al., supra note 13, at 886; Thomas Greaney, New Health Care 
Symposium: Dubious Health Care Merger Justifications—The Sumo Wrestler & ‘Government 
Made Me Do It’ Defenses, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 24, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/ 
02/24/dubious-health-care-merger-justifications-the-sumo-wrestler-and-government-made-me-do 
-it-defenses/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2017); Dafny et al., supra note 13, at 1, 3. 
 34. See Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 237. 
 35. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 4, at 2. 
 36. See Joseph M. Miller & Brian C. Lewis, Monopsony and Health Plan Mergers: Does 
Anthem-Cigna Signal a Shift in Policy?, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/North-America-
Column-September-Full.pdf. 
 37. See, e.g., Dafny et al., supra note 13, at 29. 
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the acquisition of leverage by insurers to be present, that perception can 
encourage providers to combine—via conduct or merger—and thus ultimately 
increase prices.38 But, as a general matter, the courts struggle with when exactly 
coordinated reductions in upstream prices by downstream purchasers can be 
viewed as being anti-competitive precisely because they believe that consumers 
still benefit from lower prices.39 
C. Analysis of Joint Conduct by Independent Firms: Per Se, Quick Look or 
Structured Rule of Reason, and Full Rule of Reason 
Joint conduct by independent firms can be analyzed via one of three different 
paths: (1) per se illegality, (2) quick look or structured rule of reason, or (3) full 
rule of reason. These paths fall along a spectrum rather than being mutually 
exclusively categories.40 For example, in the so-called eBooks case in which 
Apple was ultimately found guilty of having orchestrated a per se illegal price-
fixing conspiracy with four out of five book publishers, there were factual 
disputes over the purpose of the conspiracy (e.g., to thwart Amazon’s low-cost 
pricing of eBooks versus introducing a new Apple iBooks product to compete 
with Amazon) and over the degree of coordination involved.41 To buttress the 
treatment of this conspiracy as being per se illegal, the federal government and 
several states therefore introduced evidence of actual price increases in the 
eBooks market because of Apple’s conduct.42 While that kind of check can be 
germane to a quick look analysis or structured rule of reason analysis (the 
concept of which is explained below) and certainly is relevant to a full rule of 
reason analysis (also explained below), it is not supposed to be required for a 
per se illegal analysis of joint conduct. 
Moreover, it can be tricky to determine which category may be appropriate 
for addressing certain types of business conduct. This can be illustrated by 
thinking about the formation of independent physician medical groups as 
opposed to those groups entering price-fixing arrangements with their 
competitors or affiliating with large provider systems. The formation of an 
independent physician medical group as a venture of formerly independent 
physicians to deliver coordinated care most likely presents competitive concerns 
only in their initial formation. However, when that medical group then enters 
price-fixing arrangements with their competitors to obtain bargaining leverage 
with plans, or when it affiliates with a hospital provider system to that end, then 
 
 38. See Miller & Lewis, supra note 36. 
 39. Compare, e.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 989 n.6, 990 (9th 
Cir. 2000), with, e.g., Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Trust v. Trina Solar Ltd., 833 F.3d 
680, 689 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1582 (2017). 
 40. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999). 
 41. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 291, 327 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 1376 (2016). 
 42. See id. at 310. 
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issues can arise. And as far as provider systems themselves are concerned, a case 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that a dominant 
hospital provider system in a town in Ohio, whose hospitals still were 
independent for some purposes, could be functionally treated as if it were an 
agreement between independent actors rather than as an integrated entity.43 
For certain types of joint conduct, e.g., secret price-fixing agreements 
among competitors known as cartels, market power need not be shown 
collectively or individually, and it is conclusively presumed (and thus cannot be 
rebutted) that excuses or justifications do not exist for that kind of conduct. 
Hence that kind of conduct is referred to in legal terminology as per se illegal or 
hardcore conduct.44 For other types of joint conduct, e.g., the eBooks price-
fixing conspiracy or an agreement among independent physicians to fix the fees 
charged to insurers, such conduct can still be treated as per se illegal, with no 
showing of market power required and no excuses or justifications accepted, so 
long as a check is performed to make sure that such conduct should be treated 
as being equivalent to a cartel.45 That check can involve ascertaining if any 
asserted pro-competitive efficiencies supporting that joint conduct are plausible 
or if there are factual indicia, such as a market-wide increase in prices, 
supporting the treatment of that joint conduct as per se illegal.46 
However, joint conduct cannot be shielded from treatment as being per se 
illegal, or even be found to be legal in a quick look, a structured rule of reason, 
or a full rule of reason context, if the justifications in question are related to non-
competition related goals. For example, the courts have rejected justifications 
based on the asserted need to create private intellectual property rights47 or to 
combat low pricing or predatory pricing by a competitor.48 Rather, the 
achievement of those goals, or the balancing of those goals with competition-
related concerns, is left to government agencies and the enactment of additional 
laws by state legislatures or the U.S. Congress.49 This is an important point for 
 
 43. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 817 F.3d 934, 936, 945 (6th Cir. 
2016). 
 44. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY 2 
(Jan. 2007), http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/37921908.pdf. 
 45. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 327–28. 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 328–30. 
 47. See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 
467–68 (1941). 
 48. See, e.g., Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 331–33. 
 49. For example, under federal antitrust law, if physicians form a venture solely to bargain 
jointly with insurers on fees, i.e., there is no evidence of any plausible pro-competitive efficiency, 
that venture is treated as per se illegal. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 
332, 354–55 (1982); Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,025, 67,027 
(Oct. 28, 2011). In a reaction to the Maricopa decision, the California Legislature proceeded down 
a different path in allowing providers to create “efficient[ly]-sized” contracting units. CAL. BUS. & 
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health care: Issues regarding the adequacy of provider networks and 
corresponding provider pricing raise concerns closely similar to these cases 
involving non-competition related issues and as such should be addressed by 
government actors rather than by private entities who may otherwise use these 
issues as an excuse to engage in anti-competitive conduct.50 
Joint conduct that is not per se illegal can be struck down as being illegal 
under either a quick look, a structured rule of reason analysis, or a full rule of 
reason analysis. A quick look analysis involves conduct that an observer with 
just a rudimentary understanding of economics can view as anti-competitive; in 
such an eventuality, not only is a showing of market power not required but also 
the burden shifts to defendants to proffer pro-competitive reasons justifying that 
conduct.51 Conversely, a reverse quick look analysis may also be employed to 
dismiss cases where the conduct in question is obviously pro-competitive to an 
observer with just a rudimentary understanding of economics.52 
However, in such circumstances the courts have increasingly turned to a 
structured rule of reason—though they have not forbidden the use of quick look 
analysis altogether.53 A structured rule of reason allows a court to presume 
conduct to be anti-competitive if certain facts are shown without having to do 
the full market analysis to determine market power, or alternative analysis of 
market-wide effects, required in a full rule of reason context.54 However, in 
contrast to quick look, the presumption of anti-competitive effects can be 
rebutted.55 And while justifications or excuses for business conduct may be 
offered by defendants, a structured rule of reason can enable courts to disallow 
the assertion of certain justifications—if supported by economics—while 
allowing for the possibility that other justifications may exist to which a court 
should give more detailed consideration.56 
One example of the application of a structured rule of reason is tying, which 
is the forced sale of one product together with another separate product (though 
alternatively tying has been characterized as being subject to a quasi-per se 
illegal mode of analysis).57 Another example of such an application would be 
 
PROF. CODE § 16770(d)(e); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342.6; CAL. INS. CODE § 10133.6. 
Nonetheless, such contracting units can still be struck down under the same antitrust standards 
applicable to other presumptively legal enterprises, such as the rule of reason. See CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 1342.6. 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 252 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 
855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 51. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770–71 (1999). 
 52. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010). 
 53. See, e.g., Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 329–330. 
 54. See, e.g., In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 862 (Cal. 2015). 
 55. See, e.g., id. 
 56. See id. at 869–70. 
 57. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish: Why Ties Without a Substantial 
Foreclosure Share Should Not Be Per Se Legal, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 463, 466 (2016); see also, 
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reverse payments in the pharmaceutical context, i.e., a large monetary or non-
monetary payment by a brand manufacturer to a generic manufacturer (or vice 
versa) to limit competition in a market for a certain drug.58 
If conduct is subject to a full rule of reason analysis, a plaintiff must show 
either anti-competitive effects arising from that conduct—or show that such 
effects are likely to arise—before the burden shifts to a defendant to proffer pro-
competitive reasons for that conduct.59 A plaintiff may show such effects in one 
of two ways: (1) by showing directly that anti-competitive effects have arisen 
from the conduct in question, e.g., an increase in market prices or a decrease in 
output, such that market power may be presumed in what is known as a direct 
effects analysis,60 or (2) by showing that a defendant has a sufficient market 
share from which market power may be presumed61 in combination with a 
showing that the conduct in question is likely to cause anti-competitive effects 
if a firm has market power.62 
 
e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 
939, 981–82 (2016) (noting that tying is “tilted in favor of plaintiffs by dispensing with the need to 
show foreclosure as to the tied product.”). 
 58. See In re Cipro I & II, 348 P.3d at 850. 
 59. See id. at 862. 
 60. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) 
(noting that direct effects evidence is enough under the rule of reason); Toys-R-Us v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that one way to prove market power is “through 
direct evidence of anticompetitive effects”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 (1984); cf. In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare 
Corp., Docket No. 9315, at 63–67 (F.T.C. 2007) (showing actual price increase by merged entity 
in post hoc merger analysis was enough to demonstrate anti-competitive analysis where regression 
analysis, pre- and post-merger documents of the merged entity, and testimony from insurers all 
supported the conclusion that the price increase arose from the market power of the combined entity 
and not from any competitively-benign factors). 
 61. E.g., Tops Market, Inc. v. Quality Market, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining 
that market power “may be proven directly by evidence of the control of prices or the exclusion of 
competition, or it may be inferred from one firm’s large percentage share of the relevant market”). 
 62. E.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distributors, Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129–30 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (noting that allegation of defendant’s market power was not enough where plaintiff 
failed to meet burden under rule of reason of showing that restraint was likely to lead to anti-
competitive effects); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (“[I]f it seems that the defendant does have the power to restrain trade substantially, then 
inquiry proceeds to the question whether the challenged practice was likely . . . to help rather than 
hurt competition.”); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 
(1999) (“[T]here must be some indication that the court making the decision has properly identified 
the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects actually are 
anticompetitive. Where . . . the circumstances of the restriction are somewhat complex, assumption 
alone will not do.”). 
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Insofar as market shares are concerned, though more than a fifty percent 
market share is normally required for an antitrust conduct action to prevail,63 the 
courts have both avoided requiring a set market share to prevail and have 
carefully emphasized that the market share required for joint conduct need not 
be as high as for a monopoly cause of action (discussed in more detail below), 
as witnessed by case law involving tying64 or exclusive dealing.65 Indeed, 
 
 63. E.g., AREEDA ET AL., supra note 1, at 249–50 (noting that although some courts have 
found less than fifty to sixty percent market shares can still create a jury question as to market 
power, commentators recommend that “[b]ecause it would be rare indeed to find that a firm with 
half of a market could individually control price over any significant period, we would presume 
that market shares below 50 or 60 percent do not constitute [market] power.”). But even those 
commentators, who have had a lot of influence on antitrust law, note that the market shares required 
to show market power may, as a practical matter, depend upon the degree of confidence that a 
market has been properly defined: “If the court’s confidence is high that a relevant market has been 
identified that properly groups close substitutes, excludes non substitutes, and is protected by high 
entry barriers, then market shares along the lower range of acceptability are permissible.” Id. at 
243. 
 64. Tying arrangements condition the sale of one distinct product or service (the “tying 
product”) on the sale of another distinct product or service (the “tied product”) or the agreement 
not to purchase the tied product or service from any other supplier. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. 
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
461–62 (1992); see also Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that tying can be per se illegal if the defendant has market power in 
the market for the tying product. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15–17 
(1984). Market power is the “ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output.” Eastman 
Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464 (quoting Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 
(1969)). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that market power in the tying product market will be 
inferred if “the seller’s share of the market is high.” Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. at 17. In determining what market share of the tying product market is sufficiently high 
to infer market power, the Court has rejected a thirty percent market share as being sufficient. Id. 
at 26–27. However, the Court has never defined a specific market share threshold for inferring 
market power, id. at 37 n.6 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and has held that a firm need not have a 
monopoly or dominant position in the tying product market for it to have market power, United 
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (“[T]hese decisions do not 
require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for 
a tying product.”). 
 65. Exclusive dealing agreements, in which a distributor agrees to distribute only the goods of 
a certain manufacturer to the detriment of other manufacturers, are subject to full rule of reason 
treatment because these “agreements can achieve legitimate economic benefits (reduced cost, stable 
long-term supply, predictable prices).” Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of R.I., 373 F.3d 57, 65–66 (1st Cir. 2004). To draw an inference of anti-competitive effects under 
this full rule of reason analysis, plaintiffs must show a significant enough foreclosure share in the 
relevant market, i.e., that the exclusive agreement covers a significant percentage of the relevant 
market for a sufficiently long enough a period that these agreements may give the defendants 
market power and drive rivals out of the market, all other factors being equal. See, e.g., Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 45 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle, 
S.A., 656 F.3d 112, 123–24 (1st Cir. 2011); Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 373 F.3d 57 at 66; 
Eastern Food Servs. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004); Omega 
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recently a lower court accepted a market share as low as 26.4% as being 
sufficient to demonstrate market power given other market factors. 66 Although 
that case was reversed on appeal, the appellate court left undisturbed the notion 
that a set minimum market share is not required for a showing of market power.67 
In the realm of health care, this is an important point for both providers and 
insurers because modest market shares may, as discussed above, still allow for 
the exercise of market power.  
Moving on from the assessment of market shares, once a plaintiff makes the 
requisite showing of direct effects or of a sufficient market share from which a 
presumption of market power may be made, a defendant can then show the 
existence of pro-competitive justifications or excuses as a defense.68 If a 
defendant can make such a showing, the question is then raised of whether a 
plaintiff may show the existence of substantially less restrictive practical 
alternatives to the conduct in question that would achieve the same goals as those 
 
Envtl, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 1997); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. 
v. Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc., 676 F.2d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982). The foreclosure market 
screen requires a minimum market share for these agreements of twenty percent to forty percent. 
See, e.g., Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 373 F.3d at 68; Twin City Sportservice, Inc., 676 F.2d at 
1301 (holding twenty-four percent foreclosure sufficient). The use of this foreclosure market screen 
does not involve only the exclusive dealing agreement under consideration but also other exclusive 
dealing agreements in the relevant market, see Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 373 F.3d at 66, as 
well as any tying agreements, see Twin City Sportservice, Inc., 676 F.2d at 1301, as well as any 
tying agreements, see id. 
 66. United States et al. v. Am. Express Co. 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 190–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d 
on other grounds, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co, 
No. 16-1454, 2017 WL 2444673 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017). The actual criteria for proving a relevant 
market, either for rule of reason purposes or for monopoly purposes, are beyond the scope of this 
article but can be traced back to a trio of cases, United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 351 
U.S. 377, 380–81 (1956), Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962), and United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1966). For purposes of this article, it is important 
to note that the question of what constitutes the relevant market is a highly fact-dependent one. See, 
e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The scope of the 
market is a question of fact as to which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.”); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he determination of a relevant market is a 
factual question to be resolved by the District Court.”); In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern 
Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315, at 57 n.67 (F.T.C. 2007) (“However, market definition 
fundamentally is a question of fact.”). Because appellate courts can, and have, reversed ill-
supported factual determinations adverse to the government, including in the health care merger 
context, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 339 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“[T]he District Court erred in both its formulation and its application of the proper legal 
test” for determining the relevant geographical market.), the highly fact-dependent nature of 
defining a market does not preclude this article’s call for vigorous antitrust enforcement even as it 
suggests that such vigorous enforcement has inherent limits. 
 67. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 201 n.47 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted on 
other grounds sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 2017 WL 2444673 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017). 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 195. 
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for which the defendant engaged in the conduct in question in the first place.69 
Under a full rule of reason, a plaintiff may make such a showing, but the plaintiff 
carries the burden of showing that such an alternative, in fact, would apply; 
under a structured rule of reason, a plaintiff has to plead the existence of such 
alternatives but a defendant may be the one to bear the burden of showing that 
such alternatives do not, in fact, apply, as in the tying context.70 Assuming for 
the sake of argument that substantially less restrictive, practical alternatives do 
not exist, the court (or the jury) must then balance pro- and anti-competitive 
effects.71 
To this point, this analysis has assumed that the firms participating in the 
joint conduct are all willing participants. If one of the participants is not willing, 
e.g., that participant was coerced into the conspiracy because of another 
participant’s market power, the case law unequivocally recognizes the necessary 
predicate of joint conduct in the context of tying.72 Outside of the context of 
tying, the case law is split as to whether the necessary predicate of joint conduct 
is present if one of two participants was coerced into participating by the market 
 
 69. See, e.g., Emilio E. Varanini & Jonathan M. Eisenberg, Jr., Antitrust Restrictions on 
Technology Companies and Electronic Commerce, in E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW 27 (Ian 
Ballon ed., 2014). 
 70. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 57, at 515 (acknowledging presumption against accepting 
justifications for tying based on less-restrictive alternatives but then criticizing the Supreme Court 
for not considering the incentives and monitoring cost problems that those alternatives raised “in 
some cases”); Hemphill, supra note 57, at 981–82 (making same point but advocating that the 
defendants have the burden of producing evidence supporting their justification for the tying). Both 
articles, which are generally supportive of applying presumptions in the tying context, do illustrate 
nonetheless the limits of such presumptions in the minds of commentators when faced with fact-
dependent circumstances. Thus, while both articles support this article’s call for increased antitrust 
enforcement, they also illustrate the limits of such enforcement to the extent that even noted 
commentators in the antitrust field who are sympathetic to antitrust plaintiffs may be uncomfortable 
with overly broad presumptions. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
466–67 (1992) (“Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market 
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust 
claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the ‘particular facts disclosed by the record.’”) (quoting 
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925)). 
 71. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990); see Cal. Dental Ass’n 
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (goal of analysis is to identify “net procompetitive 
effects”). The full balancing step of pro- and anti-competitive effects—to determine if anti-
competitive effects outweigh pro-competitive effects—has been left to the finder of fact at trial 
without any guardrails at the trial level on how that balancing should be done or who carries the 
burden of proof. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 486–87 (1992) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting); Capital Imaging Assoc., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Ass’n, 996 F.2d 537, 
543 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing and quoting Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); 
AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH 23, THE RULE OF REASON 174 
(1999). 
 72. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 461. 
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power of the other participant, though at least under state law, the balance of the 
cases tends toward recognizing the existence of a conspiracy.73 
This leaves the question of what kind of conduct has been, or may be thought 
to, violate antitrust laws in the health care context as to insurers and providers. 
Under federal law, the formation of a venture of physicians for the sole purpose 
of bargaining for higher prices with insurers has been found to be a per se illegal 
violation.74 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the State of Michigan 
alleged that an insurer violated antitrust laws by insisting on most favored nation 
clauses in provider contracts where providers could not offer a better deal to 
rival insurers; that case ultimately was dismissed after the State of Michigan 
passed a law outlawing such clauses.75 And there was a lawsuit against a 
provider system, comprising four out of the five total hospitals in Toledo, Ohio, 
which alleged the provider system pressured insurers to exclude the fifth hospital 
from their networks so as to increase prices.76  
There is other health care related conduct on which discussion has taken 
place as to whether that conduct violates the antitrust laws. Examples of such 
conduct (on the part of providers) include all-or-nothing clauses, forcing insurers 
to include all components of a provider system on pain of including none,77 and 
anti-tiering/anti-steering clauses, which prevent insurers from charging higher 
prices for higher cost individual providers or from steering patients to lower cost, 
equal or higher quality providers.78 
Recent studies have shown that provider systems with market power can use 
such clauses to increase prices and deprive patients of choices.79 Courts, 
commentators, and the federal antitrust agencies have noted that such conduct 
 
 73. See, e.g., Kathleen Foote & John F. Cove, Jr., Monopolization, in CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 6–8 (Cheryl Lee Johnson ed., 2016). 
 74. See sources cited supra note 49. 
 75. United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668–69, 676 (E.D. 
Mich. 2011) (denying motion for summary judgment); Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1–
2, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 
2013) (No. 2:10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM). 
 76. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC, v. Atrium Health Sys., 817 F.3d 934, 936–38 (6th Cir. 
2016) (involving a provider system of independent hospitals that orchestrated a group boycott of a 
competing hospital by insurers). There are other cases involving similar, exclusionary conduct. 
E.g., Agreed Final Judgment & Stipulated Injunction Between the State of Tex. & Mem’l Hermann 
Healthcare Sys. at 1, Tex. v. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys., No. 2009-04609 (Tex. Dist.—Harris 
Cty. [281st Dist.] Jan. 26, 2009). 
 77. E.g., Sidibe v. Sutter Health, No. C 12-04854 LB, 2013 WL 2422752, at *14 (N.D. Cal. 
June 3, 2013); see also Thomas L. Greaney, Coping with Concentration, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1564, 
1565 (2017). 
 78. See, e.g., MARTHA COAKLEY, MASS. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., EXAMINATION OF 
HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 41 (2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/ 
healthcare/2010-hcctd-full.pdf; see also Greaney, supra note 77, at 1565. 
 79. See, e.g., COAKLEY, supra note 78, at 41. 
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can be treated as tying and hence can constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.80 
This is true whether that conduct is carried out directly (via contract) or 
indirectly (via coercive pricing).81 Furthermore, a district court recently rejected 
a motion to dismiss for a case brought by the U.S. DOJ and the State of North 
Carolina alleging that a dominant health care provider system in Charlotte 
violated federal antitrust law by imposing express contractual conditions that 
barred steering by insurers.82 
This discussion thus illustrates that vigorous antitrust enforcement can 
address an extremely wide range of joint anti-competitive conduct by individual 
firms. However, it also begins to shed light on the limits of such enforcement in 
implementing competition as policy, a theme to which this article will return. 
D. Analysis of Unilateral Conduct by Individual Firms: Illegal Acquisition or 
Maintenance of a Monopoly 
A monopoly, for purposes of antitrust law, has generally been found to be 
present when a single firm has a market share of greater than sixty to sixty-five 
percent.83 The courts are more reluctant to find a violation of antitrust laws based 
on actions by an individual firm, as opposed to joint conduct, because of the 
greater risk of penalizing legitimate business conduct84—which is why a higher 
market share is required for a monopoly finding. 
Moreover, it is not illegal to be a monopolist.85 Rather it is only illegal when 
a company uses illegal means to acquire or maintain a monopoly, i.e., conduct 
that the law considers exclusionary86 or predatory.87 Exclusionary or predatory 
conduct where monopolies are concerned includes tying, exclusive dealing, 
 
 80. See, e.g., Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,030 
(Oct. 28, 2011); FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE 
OF COMPETITION 34 (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-
health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723 
healthcarerpt.pdf. 
 81. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 912 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundling, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 397, 402–03 (2009). 
 82. United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK, 2017 
WL 1206015, at *1, *9 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2017). 
 83. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 
1997); Varanini & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 48. A firm can also be liable for attempted 
monopolization as well as monopolization itself, see Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 
447, 456 (1993), though a discussion of that concept is beyond the scope of this article. 
 84. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 190 (2010). 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 86. See Varanini & Eisenberg supra note 69, at 55–56. 
 87. See id. at 62–63. 
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certain kinds of bundled pricing,88 and below-cost pricing where the losses in 
question can be recouped at a later date.89 And while arbitration itself is not 
inconsistent with the antitrust laws, even if it does not involve the more formal 
process of the courts or facilitate class actions, a dominant firm’s coercive 
antitrust arbitration clauses—with terms that make remedying such a violation 
more difficult, if not impossible—is a different kettle of fish.90 Indeed, the 
antitrust laws can view behavior committed by a monopolist as anti-competitive 
that would be seen as pro-competitive if committed by a non-monopolist.91  
As with the rule of reason, a plaintiff must show that a firm has a monopoly 
and that its actions have, or will likely lead to, an anti-competitive result such as 
increased prices, lower output, lower quality, or lower choice. A defendant can 
offer a pro-competitive justification for its conduct, though a plaintiff may show 
a substantively less restrictive alternative. And if both anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects flow from a company’s unilateral acts, those effects are to 
be balanced by the ultimate trier of fact.92 Such monopoly cases have been 
brought in health care.93  
More vigorous antitrust enforcement going forward would allow for 
monopoly cases to be brought to remedy the same kind of anti-competitive 
conduct discussed above in the joint conduct section of this article: where an 
individual firm has market power approaching monopoly levels and where its 
coercion of its counterparties (e.g., a monopolist insurer coercing providers or a 
monopolist provider coercing insurers) may make a court reluctant to infer joint 
conduct. 
But while litigation can blaze the way for addressing such anti-competitive 
conduct, ultimately legislation may be a far more effective tool for carrying out 
competition as a policy goal.94 The reason for this is that courts, proceeding on 
 
 88. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 901, 903, 912 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 89. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993). 
 90. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval, 
110 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 42 (2015). This same logic may apply in markets that involve market 
concentration with only a few firms but do not actually involve a monopoly as such. See id. at 42. 
 91. See e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Whether certain 
conduct committed by a monopolist such as exclusive dealing should be presumed anti-competitive 
does not affect the points made in this article and is therefore beyond its scope. 
 93. E.g., Complaint at 14, United States & Tex. v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11-
cv-00030 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011) (alleging monopolization of hospital services market through 
loyalty “discounts”). 
 94. For example, the U.S. DOJ and the State of Michigan brought a lawsuit against Blue Cross 
Blue Shield, alleging that its use of most favored nation clauses in its contracts was anti-
competitive. United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 809 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668 (E.D. 
Mich. 2011). After this lawsuit survived a motion for summary judgment, id. at 679, Michigan 
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a case-by-case basis, must act prudently in each individual case to ensure that 
they are not inappropriately second-guessing individual business decisions.95 
Legislation does not suffer from that same need as it reflects public value 
judgments on the utility of business conduct as a general matter. 
Of considerable importance to assessing the limits of vigorous antitrust 
enforcement in this area, is the consideration of whether parallel but independent 
anti-competitive conduct by market participants—that taken together have 
monopoly power—can constitute a violation of antitrust law. Commentators 
have made the interesting argument that such conduct may constitute a shared 
monopoly and hence should be treated as a de facto monopoly under the antitrust 
laws,96 but no court has accepted such an argument to date.97 Moreover, while 
older case law exists treating such conduct as a violation of unfair competition 
law in circumstances where the market is an oligopoly (generally four or fewer 
firms with entry being difficult), the perceived skepticism on the part of the 
courts regarding this concept has apparently inhibited the bringing of such cases 
by federal enforcers.98 This is an important point: Worries about anti-
competitive conduct have involved more than one participant in a given health 
care market,99 and studies have found aggregate anti-competitive effects from 
multiple participants in health care markets.100 It is a point that is thus suggestive 
of an independent need for legislation in carrying out competition as a policy 
goal. 
 
passed a law banning such most favored nation clauses, see Order of Dismissal without Prejudice 
1, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 28, 2013). This lawsuit was then dismissed due to the passage of that legislation. Id. at 2. 
 95. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 190 (2010). 
 96. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1187 (2013). 
 97. See, e.g., JOHN MILES, HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST L. § 5:17, Westlaw (database updated 
July 2017). The theory of shared monopolies needs to be distinguished from conspiracies to 
monopolize, which is viable as a legal theory. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., SUSAN A. CREIGHTON ET AL., PRESENTATION AT WORKSHOP ON SECTION 5 OF 
THE FTC ACT AS A COMPETITION STATUTE: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SCOPE OF SECTION 5 
4–5 (Oct. 17, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-5-ftc 
-act-competition-statute/screighton.pdf. 
 99. See, e.g., Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 29, at 255. 
 100. See Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Prices Increase in California, 
Especially Among Hospitals in the Largest Multi-Hospital Systems, 53 J. HEALTH CARE ORG., 
PROVISION, & FIN. 1, 6 (2016). 
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E. Antitrust Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions 
A merger of two firms, or the acquisition of one firm’s assets by another 
firm, violates antitrust law where there may be a substantial lessening of 
competition or where there is a tendency towards the creation of a monopoly.101 
Applying this standard, antitrust law has barred acquisitions or allowed the 
retroactive unwinding of otherwise completed acquisitions involving horizontal 
acquisitions of competitors102 and vertical acquisitions of upstream suppliers or 
downstream retailers.103 
A substantial lessening of competition is presumed under the law where the 
merger or acquisition significantly increases market concentration in a relevant 
market.104 This is because the state of competition is a proxy for consumer 
welfare under the antitrust laws and because competition itself involves not only 
price but also quality, output, innovation, and choice.105 However, federal and 
state antitrust agencies as well as the courts will look at a variety of other factors, 
such as the innovator status of a firm being acquired or whether the merging 
firms were previously close competitors, either to establish that an anti-
competitive effect is in fact likely or to address a rebuttal by defendants of the 
market concentration presumption.106 
 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (commonly referred to as Section 7 of the Clayton Act). Congress 
used this phraseology to indicate that it was concerned with probable effects arising out of mergers 
rather than effects provable to a certainty, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 
708, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2001), thus supporting the ability of federal and state government agencies to 
block mergers and acquisitions before their consummation. 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 369–71 (1963). 
 103. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 571–79, (1972); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323–24, (1962). A discussion of the history of the proscription of 
vertical mergers and of allowing vertical mergers after the imposition of certain conditions, can be 
found at Jaime Stilson, et al., Reading the Tea Leaves: Evaluating Potential Antitrust Concerns in 
Vertical Mergers Between Insurers and Health Care Providers, 30 ANTITRUST 11, 11–16 (2015). 
 104. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 
775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 105. See AYESHA BUDD ET AL., CONTRIBUTION TO INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK’S 10TH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE: COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AND CONSUMER WELFARE SETTING THE 
AGENDA 10 (May 17–20, 2001), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/ 
doc857.pdf. 
 106. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 3–4 (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-
review/100819hmg.pdf; Field & Litvack, supra note 3, at 43. Speaking generally, the method for 
proving a relevant market for assessing the competitive effect of a merger or acquisition is the same 
as it is for rule of reason or for monopoly purposes. See, e.g., PHILIP AREEDA et al., supra note 1, 
at 107. But this extended inquiry does not obviate the importance of market share presumptions in 
the merger context. See, e.g., Harry First & Eleanor M. Fox, Philadelphia National Bank: 
Globalization, and the Public Interest, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 326 (2015) (noting that the shift 
from eschewing tests for competitive effects to the market share presumptions in Philadelphia 
National Bank “made effective enforcement more likely” because of the focus on both economics 
and administration). 
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There are limits to what sort of factors may be considered. Most notably in 
health care, many economists and others have been skeptical that a merger of 
insurance companies may be justified because the merged insurance companies 
may be able to get a better price from any provider system; even if the merged 
entity can obtain lower prices (which is open to doubt), those lower prices may 
not be passed on to customers107 and may result in reduced provider availability 
or reduced quality of medical care. These themes all emerged in the Anthem-
Cigna merger in the district court’s skeptical take on this justification.108 
If this market concentration presumption is not rebutted, it is generally 
accepted (albeit with considerable court skepticism) that the merging parties can 
assert the defense that a merger is likely to lead to pro-competitive effects, such 
as the production of a new product or an improvement in product quality.109 
However, the more concentrated the market, the greater the efficiencies must be, 
with a two-to-one merger requiring truly “extraordinary efficiencies.”110 
Moreover, those efficiencies must be merger-specific: The defendants must 
show that those efficiencies could not be achieved in other ways, such as by the 
formation of a joint venture, and that these efficiencies will benefit consumers 
rather than shareholders or managers by showing, for example, that any cost 
savings from the merger will be passed on, in whole or in part, to consumers of 
their products.111 Further, these efficiencies must also be verifiable, that is to say 
not speculative.112 Consequently, when merging health care providers have 
argued that the merger would allow them to engage in risk-sharing pricing that 
will benefit consumers through lower costs and higher quality, the courts have 
required those parties to show that such a result could not be achieved through a 
looser affiliation.113 
Although historically the courts have been unwilling to block horizontal 
provider mergers,114 that situation changed with the development of new 
economic modes of analyzing the competitive effects of these mergers, such as 
the two-stage model discussed above. For example, in a recent case in the Ninth 
Circuit, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court blocking a 
horizontal merger of a provider system, which included physicians and 
 
 107. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 33. 
 108. See United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 249–51 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 855 
F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 109. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 
775, 789 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 110. E.g., id. at 790; Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 236. 
 111. E.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc., 778 F.3d at 790–91; Anthem, Inc., 236 F. 
Supp. 3d at 236–37. 
 112. See, e.g., Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d. at 236. 
 113. E.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc., 778 F.3d at 790–92. 
 114. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 464, 468–
73 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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hospitals, with a physician group in Nampa, Idaho.115 And there have been even 
more recent decisions from the Seventh Circuit116 and Third Circuit117 also 
barring horizontal provider mergers under this two-stage model. 
Similarly, district courts have blocked two blockbuster horizontal insurer 
mergers: Aetna-Humana118 and Anthem-Cigna.119 Although the merging parties 
appealed the Anthem-Cigna merger decision to the District of Columbia Circuit, 
that appellate court upheld the district court in a two-to-one decision, forcing 
Anthem to abandon the merger.120 
Additionally, as to vertical mergers, the courts have imposed serious 
behavioral conditions on vertical provider acquisitions such as instituting a 
mandatory arbitration procedure for provider-insurer disputes121 or pursuant to 
a recent decision of the Federal Trade Commission providing incentives to 
doctors to allow them to switch medical groups.122 Antitrust public enforcers 
generally have not yet sought to bar these vertical acquisitions because of other 
considerations, such as the financial solvency of the providers to be acquired.123  
But with the review of mergers as with the review of conduct, there are 
important limitations under antitrust law. Principally, antitrust law does not 
address the question of whether a merger should be allowed in the absence of 
benefits to competition or to consumers, e.g., if the merger’s competitive effects 
 
 115. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc., 778 F.3d at 792. 
 116. E.g., Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d at 464, 456–66. 
 117. E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 333–34 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
 118. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 119. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 179 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 855 F.3d 
345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 120. United States v. Anthem, 855 F.3d 345, 348–49 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (rejecting Anthem’s 
contention that the district court erred in rejecting Anthem’s claims of efficiencies from the 
merger). 
 121. See, e.g., Amended Final Order at 2, 8–9, Penn. v. Geisinger Health Sys. Found., No. 1:13 
CV-02647-YK (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2013); Unopposed Motion to Approve and Enter Final Order at 
7, Penn. v. Urology of Cent. Penn., Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01625-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2011); see also 
RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & ROBERT A. BERENSON, URBAN INST., CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC 
ADVANTAGE: CAN THEY ADDRESS PROVIDER MARKET POWER? 19–20 (2015), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/42226/2000111-Certificates-of-Public-
Advantage.pdf. 
 122. Decision and Order at 7, In re CentraCare Health Sys., Docket No. C-4594 (F.T.C. Jan. 6. 
2017). 
 123. See generally KWOKA, supra note 11, at 140 (noting that antitrust authorities might have 
to resort to conduct remedies in extreme circumstances where a provider may fail or where the 
merger may result in substantially large merger-specific efficiencies that would otherwise be lost). 
But the reluctance to challenge vertical mergers is beginning to change. See State of Cal. v. Valero 
Energy Corp. et al., 2017 WL 3705059 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017). How this will play out in the 
health care space remains to be seen. 
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are neutral124 or are otherwise difficult to ascertain. This is an important point: 
The correlation between substantial increases in market concentration in an 
industry and increases in price125 suggests that the toll on the general economy 
from allowing certain mergers could be greater than one would think, which is 
a point supported by recent evidence that mergers cannot simply be presumed to 
be efficient as a general rule.126 Finally, as with coordinated reductions in input 
prices by downstream purchasers, the courts struggle with whether reductions in 
input prices arising from the merger of two downstream purchasers of that input 
are anti-competitive even if those reductions are not market wide or even if those 
reductions could translate into, or do translate into, lower quality or provider 
availability.127  
In summary, whether to allow mergers in certain areas already subject to 
extensive regulation can involve social trade-off issues that in involving non-
competition related goals go beyond antitrust law. Correspondingly, these 
points, when all taken together, do support a call for a more systematic 
legislatively-imposed process for reviewing mergers in an industry, specifically 
where that industry may be highly regulated and difficult to enter to begin 
with,128 that would supplement the more case-by-case competition-based focus 
of antitrust law. 
F. Antitrust Remedies 
Ultimately, while antitrust law can be quite supple in the conduct remedies 
that can be imposed through settlements and court actions, there are limitations 
in how far conduct remedies can go.129 If an action is brought based on illegal 
 
 124. Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (explaining that 
conduct is not illegal under a rule of reason analysis if the agreement on its face “might plausibly 
be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition”). 
 125. See Peter C. Carstensen, The Philadelphia National Bank Presumption: Merger Analysis 
in an Unpredictable World, 80 ANTIRUST L.J. 219, 247 (2015). 
 126. See, e.g., at 252; Philadelphia National Bank at 50: An Interview with Judge Richard 
Posner, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 205, 216–17 (2015). 
 127. See Carstensen, supra note 125, at 254. 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 221–22 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 
855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 129. See, e.g., New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 152, 178, 183–84 (D.D.C. 
2002). The Microsoft case is an interesting example as to the ill-understood efficacy of conduct 
remedies in many cases. See id. While the district court rejected the “structural” kind of remedies 
proposed by California and several other states (the California Group), the conduct remedies 
obtained by the U.S. DOJ and other states, as modified by certain provisions obtained by the 
California Group, involved extensive conduct remedies, including remedies involving related 
markets and ongoing monitoring of new technologies developed by Microsoft to ascertain 
compliance. See id. at 183–84, 186. Those measures had a much more salutary effect than they get 
credit for in restoring competition to technology and software markets that are intertwined with the 
internet even if they may not have been as effective as structural relief would have been. See 
Varanini & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 95. For a fuller analysis see, for example, id. at 94–117. 
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conduct, remedies may involve a cessation of the illegal conduct in question, 
disgorgement of profits, compliance training, and other measures in the affected 
markets or closely related markets designed to restore competition going 
forward.130 However, the courts have become more reluctant to order structural 
remedies, such as the divestment of assets or the breakup of a firm in the case of 
a monopoly.131 This is important because structural relief can be viewed by 
courts as being easier to implement than conduct relief, as the latter requires 
ongoing judicial supervision.132 
If an action is brought to block a merger, remedies may include blocking the 
merger, even retrospectively (after the fact)133 or implementing measures that 
fall short of outright blocking it. That latter set of measures can include the 
divestment of assets to a third party and the imposition of conditions with 
ongoing monitoring from the court and from government agencies.134  
The divestment of assets in a merger context can be a preferred option where 
there is a willing third party, where the assets to be divested are complete enough 
that the third party can viably compete, and where the negative competitive 
effects of the merger would be eliminated or substantially mitigated by such a 
divestment.135 However, there are two questions with such a divestment: (1) Are 
the issues involved, such as the assignment of contracts, back office support, 
monetary resources, access to technology, and government approvals of such 
complexity that a divestment would likely fail to create a viable competitor?;136 
and (2) Would the third party use the divested assets to become a viable 
competitor? 
 
 130. See, e.g., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Settlements Totaling $4.95 
Million with LG, Hitachi, Panasonic, Toshiba and Samsung over Price-Fixing Scheme, ST. CAL. 
DEP’T JUSTICE (Mar. 30, 2016), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-
harris-announces-settlements-totaling-495-million-lg (last visited Nov. 14, 2017). 
 131. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105–07 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (imposing 
structural relief via a retrospective Clayton Act case to remedy anti-competitive effects of an 
acquisition is easier than imposing such relief for monopolistic conduct). 
 132. See KWOKA, supra note 11, at 133–34. 
 133. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 571–72, 578 (1972) (affirming 
comprehensive relief—divestiture, supply requirements, behavioral requirements, and protections 
for divested assets and employees—to ensure the restoration of competition on an acquisition that 
was several years old when challenged by the federal government); St. Alphonsus Medical Center-
Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Care Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that the district court’s divestiture order was amply justified even though the merger took place 
prior to the district court’s hearing because there was testimony from the acquired physician’s group 
that they could compete independently because: (1) employees of the group had been told they 
would have their jobs no matter what, and (2) the acquiring system had agreed to pay nine million 
dollars to the acquired physician’s group as part of the merger). 
 134. See, e.g., KWOKA, supra note 11, at 128, 139. 
 135. See e.g., id. at 128–30, 133. 
 136. See, e.g., Complaint at 4–5, United States v. Haliburton Co, No. 1:16-cv-00233-UNA (D. 
Del. Apr. 6, 2016). 
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Accordingly, examples exist where such divestments in the past did not 
achieve the desired result of preventing an increase in prices.137 The need for 
courts to ensure that viable third-party competitors arise out a divestment 
process also presents difficult questions for the courts to answer: (1) Can direct 
monitoring of such competitors ever take place once a divestment occurs and if 
so, when would it be appropriate?; (2) Is it easy to address a short-run exit 
problem if one, in fact, occurs even with such direct monitoring?; (3) How much 
due diligence can one do beforehand as to the viability of a third-party 
competitor, and should competitive commitments be required from such third 
parties beforehand? 
That leaves behavioral conduct remedies that regulate or cabin the conduct 
of a firm in some manner but do not require the breakup of that firm itself or the 
spin-off of assets. As noted above, conduct remedies are quite common where 
vertical mergers are concerned,138 such as in the telecommunications industry 
where a federal regulator, the Federal Communications Commission, is involved 
as well as state and federal antitrust agencies.139 In that industry, though these 
conduct remedies—such as imposing net neutrality, non-retaliation, and/or 
equal access type of provisions to avoid content discrimination or 
disadvantaging competitors—can appear to be limited, but these remedies can, 
in fact, succeed in mitigating or preventing the negative anti-competitive effects 
of such mergers.140 
In health care, the federal agencies prefer not to use such conduct remedies 
in the context of horizontal mergers, a stance validated by the courts.141 
However, the states—faced with hospitals that may fail unless they are acquired, 
hospitals for which continued community service is essential, or provider 
systems whose acquisitions may only enhance market power at the margins—
have been more willing to use creative conduct remedies. For example, the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General has used conduct remedies to address provider 
acquisitions, including such remedies as barring higher hospital-based prices for 
services rendered by newly acquired physicians and requiring its newly acquired 
providers to have a separate and independent negotiating team to negotiate 
prices in good faith with insurers.142 If insurers cannot negotiate what they 
believe to be a fair price from the provider, they may request arbitration with 
certain guaranteed processes to ensure a fair outcome.143 
 
 137. See, e.g., KWOKA, supra note 11, at 107–08, 120. 
 138. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Varanini & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 152–53. 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 79, 126–57. 
 141. See, e.g., St. Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Care Sys., 778 
F.3d 775, 793 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 142. Amended Final Order at 14, supra note 121, at 8, 14. 
 143. See, e.g., Final Order at 7–10, Commonwealth of Penn. v. Urology of Central Penn., Inc., 
No. 1:11-cv-01625-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011). Albeit in a non-health care context, the 
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Those conduct remedies can be effective, but there are limits to how far one 
can go with them in the merger context. For example, the Massachusetts 
Attorney General, faced with the acquisition of two hospitals that she thought 
might fail by a provider system that already had market power, entered into a 
settlement allowing the acquisition to proceed in exchange for the imposition of 
several conditions applicable to the entire provider system, such as a six and 
one-half year price cap across the entire provider system, restrictions on future 
acquisitions, and an allowance for insurers to purchase a la carte access to the 
different components of that system.144 Ultimately, that Massachusetts 
settlement, in contrast to the settlements in Pennsylvania, was disapproved by 
the state court because it involved complex provisions applicable to the entire 
provider system (such as the price cap) that required close ongoing judicial 
supervision.145 
In short, as far as conduct remedies in the merger space are concerned, the 
more complex the remedies in combination with ongoing supervision required 
by the court, the more the courts may look askance at such remedies. The more 
those remedies are cabined so that they do not involve the courts directly making 
complex determinations such as pricing, and the more that violations can be 
resolved with minimal court processes such as the use of fair and voluntary 
arbitration processes in provider-insurer negotiations or the use of a court-
appointed special master or monitor,146 the more successful such conduct 
remedies can be.147  
 
California Attorney General has used a similar, voluntary, and fair arbitration process to avoid 
judicial concerns over the supervision of potentially complex court terms. See Final Judgment and 
Order Pursuant to Stipulation at 5–6, State of Cal. v. Pratibha Syntex, LTD., No. BC499751 (Cal. 
Super. Dec. 15, 2015); see also Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Landmark 
Settlement with Pratibha Syntex Ltd., OFF. OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 28, 2015), http://oag. 
ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-landmark-settlement-
pratibha-syntex (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
 144. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Joint Motion for Entry of Amended Final 
Judgment by Consent at 3, 10, 12–13, 16, Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 
SUCV2014-02033-BLS2 (Sup. Ct. Mass. Jan. 29, 2015). 
 145. Id. at 15–16, 46–48. 
 146. It has been suggested to the author of this article that state agencies could serve in such a 
role along with special masters and monitors. While state agencies would need to have the statutory 
authority necessary to serve in such a role, one could imagine cases involving joint jurisdiction by 
both a court and a state agency in which they may both work together to craft and supervise 
otherwise complex remedies over a long period of time until new competition emerges. See e.g., 
BOVBJERG & BERENSON, supra note 121, at 1–2, 4–5, 11, 20–23 (discussing the exercise of joint 
jurisdiction of a state agency and the Attorney General of North Carolina over a provider system 
pursuant to the certificate of public advantage process). 
 147. As far as Microsoft involved the use of monitors by the two separate government enforcer 
groups, it too fits the pattern of using out-of-court methods to enable the enforcement of an 
otherwise complex court decree to occur in a manner that would not ensnare the court in 
determinations that either would be difficult or would involve minutiae. See New York v. Microsoft 
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Ultimately, however, the discussion in this section illustrates the practical 
limitations that can adhere to antitrust remedies in the judicial setting while 
facilitating competition as policy. Correspondingly, the discussion of antitrust 
principles and remedies—and their limits—raises the question of whether other 
measures exist that can go beyond antitrust in implementing competition as 
policy. It is to that question that this article now turns. 
III.  CONTRASTING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT WITH INCENTIVES TO INCREASE 
COMPETITION 
Antitrust enforcement’s goal, in the first instance, is not to increase 
competition over what prevailed in the status quo ante, i.e., what prevailed prior 
to the commission of anti-competitive conduct or an anti-competitive 
acquisition.148 However, providing incentives can result in such an increase in 
competition. To give one relatively simple example, a serious and credible 
suggestion has been made that prizes be awarded to further development of 
pharmaceutical alternatives.149 This could have a substantial impact on the 
development of drugs for which conventional incentives may not suffice, such 
as improved antibiotics, cheaper insulin, or medications to treat rare diseases. 
Significant, albeit more complex, examples of such pro-competitive 
incentives abound in health care. For example, California has passed a series of 
laws over the past couple of years to increase price transparency in the selection 
of providers on one’s health insurance; that transparency is designed to give 
consumers the tools necessary to select lower cost providers of quality health 
care.150 Covered California, the agency that runs the intrastate regional 
exchanges for the sale of insurance policies in the individual and small group 
markets under the ACA,151 promulgated regulations requiring insurers to report 
on those providers who provide either the costliest service or the lowest quality 
services (measured based on benchmarks set by Covered California) and then 
either provide a remedial plan or explain the circumstances as to why insurers 
continue to contract with those providers.152 These regulations give insurers an 
 
Corp., 224 F. Supp.2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2002); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 81–82 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
 148. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER 
REMEDIES 1 (June 2011), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/06/17/272350.pdf. 
 149. See Bryan P. Schwartz & Marhi Kim, Economic Prizes: Filling the Gaps in 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH 1, 47–
48 (2005), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/CIPIHSubmissionsBryan 
Schwartz.pdf?ua=1. 
 150. See, e.g., Health Care Coverage: Provider Contracts: Hearing on S.B. 751 Before the 
Assembly Comm. on Health, 2011–12 Leg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2011). 
 151. What is Covered California?, COVERED CAL., https://www.coveredca.com/what-is-
covered-california/ (last visited November 4, 2017). 
 152. See, e.g., Attachment 7: Quality, Network Management, Delivery System Standards and 
Improvement Strategy, COVERED CAL. 3–4 (Feb. 18, 2016), http://board.coveredca.com/meetings/ 
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incentive to contract with low-cost providers that can provide quality medical 
care, and are reasonably accessible, over those higher-cost providers that may 
not be better in terms of quality medical care or accessibility. Additionally, 
incentives exist on the federal level, such as those encouraging the formation of 
risk-sharing Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) involving an arrangement 
between various providers and insurers.153 
While these incentives can and do encourage competition, they can also be 
gamed or hindered such that their goals of furthering competition are not partly 
or fully realized. A provider with market power can form an ACO that does 
nothing more than reduce monopoly profits, possibly in exchange for a grant of 
exclusivity to safeguard those profits.154 Even an insurer desiring to fulfill the 
goals of Covered California cannot force providers with market power to allow 
for steering, tiering, and all-or-nothing contracting—given Covered California 
may arguably lack direct authority over providers.155 As illustrated by these 
examples, there is thus a need in thinking about competition as policy to go 
 
2016/2-18/2017%20QHP%20Issuer%20Contract%20Attachment%207_February%2018_2016_ 
CLEAN.pdf; Cal. Health Benefit Exchange Board Minutes, CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE 
BD. (Jan. 21, 2016), http://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2016/2-18/January%2021%202015%20 
Minutes%20FINAL.pdf; Cal. Health Benefit Exchange Board Minutes, CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT 
EXCHANGE BD. (Feb. 18, 2016), http://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2016/4-07/HBEX%20 
Board%20Meeting%20February%202016.pdf; Cal. Health Benefit Exchange Board Resolution 
No. 2016-09, CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE BD. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://board.coveredca.com/ 
meetings/2016/4-07/HBEX%20Board%20Meeting%20February%202016.pdf. A somewhat 
parallel example exists in Massachusetts—with efforts having been made to encourage insurers to 
enter global or capitated pricing arrangements with providers to share upside and downside risk 
that have had success—though more remains to be done. MASS. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., 
EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 1, 14 (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/cctcd5.pdf. 
 153. See, e.g., Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027–
67,028 (Oct. 28, 2011); see also, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 230 
(D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 154. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,029. 
 155. See ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, NAT’L ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, STATE 
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS RISING PRICES CAUSED BY HEALTH CARE CONSOLIDATIONS 7 (2017), 
http://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Consolidation-Report.pdf; COVERED 
CALIFORNIA, COVERED CALIFORNIA QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN INSURER CONTRACT FOR 2016 
BETWEEN COVERED CALIFORNIA, THE CALIFORNIA HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE (“THE 
EXCHANGE”) AND (“CONTRACTOR”) 36–40 (2016), http://hbex.coveredca.com/PDFs/2016_QHP 
_Issuer_Model_Contract_and_Attachments.pdf. These incentives need not necessarily be 
subsidies. That being said, subsidies can be awarded and disbursed in a neutral administrative 
manner to jumpstart competition in new industries or enable research and development to create 
new markets. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX INCENTIVES FOR RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT: TRENDS AND ISSUES 7, http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/2498389.pdf. 
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beyond the use of incentives as well as beyond vigorous antitrust enforcement, 
thus setting the stage for this article’s discussion of market-governance rules. 
IV.  THE USE OF MARKET-GOVERNANCE RULES AS A COMPLEMENT TO 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE USE OF INCENTIVES TO ENHANCE 
COMPETITION 
Market-governance rules fill the gaps in otherwise vigorous antitrust 
enforcement and in incentives to foster competition, thereby complementing 
these measures in facilitating competition as policy reform. To understand this 
supplemental but important role that market-governance rules play in fostering 
competition as policy reform, this article will first discuss the use of public 
interest review of mergers in other industries and next the use of market-
governance rules in health care in Massachusetts as well as in a limited 
regulatory way in California. This section will turn to legislation proposed in 
California in the 2015 to 2016 legislative year and re-introduced in the current 
2017 to 2018 legislative year. 
A. Public Interest Review of Mergers and Acquisitions 
In regulated industries, mergers and acquisitions go through a public interest 
review process that takes place in front of the federal or state agencies 
responsible for supervising those industries.156 That process does not ignore or 
obviate the competition-related analysis inherent in antitrust law; indeed, a 
review of these mergers or acquisitions for competition-related concerns takes 
place as part of this public interest process.157 
However, a public interest review process can go beyond antitrust law in 
important ways. First, it can help guarantee that a merger will have beneficial 
effects on competition by guaranteeing continued, vigorous competition in 
existing markets and/or by requiring expansion into new markets, all as 
 
 156. INT’L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., 
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST: FINAL 
REPORT 87, 148 (2000). 
 157. In California, the Antitrust Section of the California Attorney General’s Office conducts 
such an analysis as part of the public interest review process for telecommunications (on the state 
level), CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 854 (effective Jan. 1, 1996), and for not-for-profits, see, e.g., 
Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12588, repealed 
and added by 1959 Cal. Stat. 1258. In contrast, in the federal process for reviewing 
telecommunications mergers and acquisitions, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. DOJ plays an 
important role in reviewing such mergers and acquisitions for competition-related concerns. See, 
e.g., Varanini & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 152, 155. While state and federal antitrust agencies 
can play an important role in providing a competition analysis to their sister regulatory agencies, it 
is noteworthy—and important—that they retain the right to conduct an independent investigation 
and bring their own action in court because there are cases where mergers need to be blocked out 
of the gate due to substantial actual or likely inimical effects on competition. See, e.g., id. at 153–
55. 
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buttressed by financial and other resource commitments.158 Examples of these 
guarantees would include the commitments obtained by the Department of 
Managed Health Care and the Department of Insurance (though neither has an 
express public interest review process) from the parties to the Centene-Health 
Net merger.159 Second, a public interest process can better ensure the viability 
of a third-party acquirer of assets from the merging party to ensure that 
competition will continue to take place in a state, as witnessed again by the 
example of financial and resource commitments obtained from the parties to the 
Centene-Health Net merger by the Department of Managed Health Care and the 
Department of Insurance.160 Third, this public interest review process may 
provide an easier path than antitrust law to address monopsony issues in the 
context of already highly-regulated industries161—even though antitrust law can 
and should continue to vigorously address these issues.162 
In fact, market regulators not only have great experience with the ongoing 
supervision of businesses in their markets but also have administrative subpoena 
and enforcement tools if businesses should violate their commitments. And 
while administrative enforcement actions are ultimately reviewed by the courts, 
such a review can take place under a deferential standard.163 
B. Legislative and Regulatory Market-Governance Measures 
As noted above, antitrust law may have limits in addressing conduct that, 
when adopted in whole or in part on an independent basis by several participants, 
can inhibit competition on a market-wide scale. However, state legislatures can 
 
 158. See Leemore Dafny et al., More Insurers Lower Premiums: Evidence from Initial Pricing 
in the Health Insurance Marketplaces, 1 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 53, 57, 79 (2015) (“[P]remium[s] 
[on the Exchanges] would have been reduced by 5.4 percent had United entered all markets.”). 
 159. See, e.g., In re Application of Centene Corp., Chopin Merger Sub I, Inc., & Chopin Merger 
Sub II, Inc., No. APP-2015-00889 2–3, 7–8 (Cal. Ins. Comm’r Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.insur 
ance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2016/Centene/upload/DecisionOrderHealthNet 
Centene.pdf; Undertakings at 10, In the Matter of Centene Acquisition of Health Net (Cal. Dept. 
Managed Health Care Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.dmhc.ca.gov/Portals/0/AbouttheDMHC/News 
Room/u032216.pdf. 
 160. See, e.g., In re Application of Centene Corp. et al., supra note 159. at 7–8; Undertakings, 
supra note 159, at 2–10. 
 161. See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 252 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 
855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Supreme Court precedent indicates that courts should not be in the 
business of making policy determinations about the appropriate allocations of healthcare dollars; 
those are value judgment that are better directed to the legislature.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235–36 
(1948); West Penn Alleghany Health Sys., Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 627 F.3d 85, 103 
(3d Cir. 2010); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988–89, 989 n.6 (9th Cir. 
2000); Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 252–53. 
 163. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a)–(c) (2012); CAL. EVID. CODE § 664 (2012); see 
also JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 573–75, 81 (Ct. App. 
2006). 
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and have passed laws that can, in supple or targeted ways, proscribe such 
conduct and in so doing enhance competition.164 Similarly, state regulators can 
also play such a role where authorized to do so by state legislatures.165 
As also noted above, antitrust law may be inhibited from addressing social 
trade-offs, such as balancing competition goals against consumer protection 
goals or determining what qualifies as an insurance product suitable for health 
care markets. However, addressing such social trade-offs is better suited for the 
legislature and for regulators in lieu of the courts applying antitrust law, as 
remarked by the district court in the Anthem-Cigna merger trial.166 
Most notably, the Massachusetts Attorney General conducted a study of the 
health care markets on how large provider systems used all-or-nothing and anti-
tiering/anti-steering contractual provisions to force insurers to increase prices167 
to the determinant of self-insured companies and of consumers forced to pay 
higher premiums. Based on that study, the Massachusetts Legislature passed 
laws that barred such contractual conditions.168 Those laws, in turn, successfully 
increased demand for tiering products though work remains to be done in 
Massachusetts on price transparency and tiered-product design to take full 
advantage of these laws.169 
In addition, the California Department of Insurance and the California 
Department of Managed Health Care had to wrestle with balancing competition 
and consumer protection goals in setting out network adequacy standards.170 
These standards had to include default rules to govern the adequacy of provider 
networks provided by insurance companies as part of their insurance products 
so that users of these products would have reasonable assurances that they would 
have close-by alternatives for their medical care.171 At the same time, these 
 
 164. That same point was made recently, for example, by the White House under the Obama 
Administration. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 4, at 2, 6, 8. 
 165. See Martin Gaynor, Competition Policy in Health Care Markets: Navigating the 
Enforcement and Policy Maze, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1088, 1090 (2014). For a discussion of examples 
at the federal level, see COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 166. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 252 (“Supreme Court precedent indicates that courts 
should not be in the business of making policy determinations about the appropriate allocations of 
healthcare dollars; those are value judgments that are better directed to the legislature.”). 
 167. COAKLEY, supra note 78, at 3–5, 41–42. 
 168. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176J, § 11 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176O, § 9A (2017). 
 169. MASS. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 151, at 7–13, 28. 
 170. See Deborah Reidy Kelch, Health Insurance Oversight in California:Observations on the 
Post-ACA Environment, HEALTH INS. ALIGNMENT PROJECT 4, http://www.kelchpolicy.com/sites/ 
default/files/insert/Health%20Insurance%20Oversight%20in%20California-Post%20ACA%20 
June%202015.pdf; STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF INS., Network Adequacy Regulation (Permanent): 
Initial Statement of Reasons, CAL. HOSP. ASS’N 2 (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.calhospital.org/ 
sites/main/files/file-attachments/init_statement_of_reasons.pdf. 
 171. See Medicaid Managed Care Final Rule: Network Adequacy Standards, STATE OF CAL.—
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY, DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS. 9, 31 (July 19, 2017), 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/Documents/FinalRuleNAFinalProposal.pdf. 
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standards also had to allow for the consideration of circumstances—including in 
principle competition-related issues—under which these default standards could 
be waived.172 
C. Proposed Additional Market-Governance Laws in California 
It has been suggested that enacting laws in California like those enacted in 
Massachusetts, as discussed in the prior section of this article, would have a 
salutary effect on restoring more symmetrical bargaining power between 
provider systems and insurers; in particular, such laws would mitigate the 
negative effects of provider market concentration on pricing for products sold 
on Covered California’s regional exchanges.173 Moreover, for reasons discussed 
above, the extension of public interest review to insurance mergers in the health 
care space in California would seem to be a natural extension of the current use 
of that review in telecommunications and the not-for-profit sector. 
As it turns out, to achieve these goals, legislation was proposed in the 
California Senate in the 2015 to 2016 legislative year174 and again in the 2017 
to 2018 legislative year.175 The current draft of this legislation in the 2017 to 
2018 legislative year involves two bills: Senate Bill 538 and Assembly Bill 
595.176  
 
 172. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.51(d)(H) (2017). 
 173. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 34; see also Fuse Brown, supra note 16, at 112–13 
(arguing that market approaches based on patient information or active purchasing by insurers 
cannot work “where there is little choice or competition between providers”); id. at 140 (referencing 
the need for private insurers and employers to “bargain aggressively”); Berenson et al, supra note 
15, at 976 (referencing one reason for the growth of health care systems via cross-market mergers 
as the desire of providers to acquire leverage over insurers). 
 174. S. COMM. ON HEALTH REPORT, S.B. 538, at 6 (Apr. 17, 2017) (discussing S.B. 932), 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB538 (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
 175. S.B. 538, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); Assemb. B. 595, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 176. Senate Bill 538 is on the California Legislature’s two-year cycle such that it can be taken 
up again in the Assembly in January 2018 after having passed the Senate on May 31, 2017. See 
S.B. 538, supra note 175; The California Legislative Process, CAL. STATE UNIV., 
http://www.calstate.edu/AcadSen/Records/Agenda/documents/The_California_Legislative_Proc 
ess.pdf. Assembly Bill 595 was placed into the suspense file by the Assembly Committee on 
Appropriations after having passed the Assembly Committee on Health, AB-595 Health Care 
Service Plans: Mergers and Acquisitions., CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB595 (last visited Nov. 21, 2017), which had 
indicated that it is most likely dead for the rest of the 2017 to 2018 legislative session, see Laurel 
Rosenhall, The Suspense Files: California Bills Vanish Almost Without a Trace, CALMATTERS 
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://calmatters.org/articles/capitol-suspense-california-bills-vanish-almost-with 
out-trace/, although it can always be reintroduced in the new legislative session. However, 
Assembly Bill 595 was just resurrected in January 2018 and passed by the Assembly, after first 
being amended, and is now in front of the Senate. Assemb. B. 595, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2018). 
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Senate Bill 538 is designed to prohibit contracts between hospitals (defined 
as including general acute care hospitals, acute psychiatric hospitals, and 
specialty hospitals) and insurers from including certain terms: (1) requiring an 
insurer to contract with any one (or more) of a hospital’s affiliates (with a 
significant exception for physician medical groups affiliated with that hospital), 
(2) setting payment rates for affiliates of the hospital that are not participating in 
that insurer’s network, (3) requiring insurers and self-insureds to agree to 
arbitration of state and federal antitrust claims as a condition for a hospital’s 
entering into a contract (but with an exception for consensual agreements), and 
(4) requiring that services provided by a hospital and its affiliates not have to be 
compensated at the same rate as all other in-network hospitals and their 
affiliates.177 The bill also contains certain provisions designed to avoid creating 
an asymmetrical bargaining relationship favoring insurers and self-insureds over 
providers; in addition to the carve outs mentioned just above, these provisions 
include a requirement that insurers not disclose contract rates to self-insureds 
without reasonable non-disclosure agreements.178 
Assembly Bill 595 would require insurance companies (including hospital 
providers that offer insurance plans) to obtain prior approval from the 
Department of Managed Health Care before merging with, acquiring, or 
obtaining direct or indirect control over another insurance plan (referred to in 
this paragraph as proposed acquisition).179 That department can grant approval 
if it finds the following: the proposed acquisition “[p]rovides short-term and 
long-term benefits in the form of lower prices, better quality, improved access 
to care, and reduced health disparities”; the proposed acquisition “[d]oes not 
adversely impact competition”; the proposed acquisition “[d]oes not jeopardize 
the financial stability of the parties”; the proposed acquisition “[d]oes not result 
in a significant effect on the availability or accessibility of existing health care 
services”; and the proposed acquisition is not being undertaken by a party that 
fails to follow state and federal laws and regulations, including those of that 
department.180 In reaching these findings, that department would be required to 
review an assessment by the California Attorney General as to “whether 
 
 177. S.B. 538, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 178. Id. This bill presently includes a provision that does not allow providers to bind “payors” 
(i.e., self-insureds) to the terms of provider contracts. Id. This article does not take a position on 
the underlying issues being addressed by this provision except to note that the author’s personal 
view is that such a provision is not needed to address those issues already addressed by the ban on 
coerced antitrust arbitration clauses in provider contracts with insurance companies. See infra note 
186 and accompanying text. 
 179. Assemb. B. 595, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). The bill was amended on April 
3, 2017 to remove the Department of Insurance as a state agency that would also have authority 
over proposed mergers and acquisitions involving health care insurers. Id. The effects of this 
amendment are beyond the scope of this article. 
 180. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
102 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 11:69 
competition would be adversely affected and what mitigation measures could be 
adopted” to avoid that result in what the bill labels an advisory opinion.181 
The Department of Managed Health Care would not, however, be required 
to vote up or down on the proposed acquisition.182 Rather, it could accept 
mitigation measures proposed by the parties, or impose its own, to remedy 
deficiencies it may find in the proposed acquisition, specifically adverse effects 
on cost, quality, access to services, or health disparities.183 
Together these two market-governance rules can address potential gaps in 
antitrust enforcement and in the use of incentives in the health care space in 
California without displacing either of those alternatives. Senate Bill 538 
proposes pro-competitive rules, of immediate impact, that could restore 
symmetrical bargaining power between insurers and providers.184 First, it bars 
out anti-competitive conduct by providers akin to tying such as all-or-nothing, 
anti-steering, and anti-tiering conduct.185 Second, it bars coerced antitrust 
 
 181. Id. The bill was amended on January 22, 2018 to remove the provision allowing the 
Attorney General to submit an assessment as to the adverse effect of the merger on competition. 
Id. Instead, it requires the Department of Managed Health Care to engage in that exercise with the 
Department now having the power to hire consultants to assist it in that exercise. Id. The removal 
of the Attorney General’s role in issuing an advisory opinion on the adverse competitive effects of 
these mergers, which is unexplained in the legislative history, lessens the benefits of this bill’s 
enhancement of competition as far as it fails to take advantage of an agency with considerable 
experience on the anti-competitive effects arising from mergers. Nonetheless, the Attorney General 
retains the power to investigate, and if appropriate seek to enjoin, these mergers under state and 
federal antitrust law. See, e.g., California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 283–85, 296–97 
(1989); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1097 (Cal. 1998) (finding 
that a prior holding of the California Supreme Court—that state Unfair Competition Law could not 
be applied to a merger—was overruled by a subsequent statutory amendment of that 
law), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Californians for Disability Rights v. 
Mervyn’s, LLC, 138 P.3d 207, 209 (Cal. 2006).  
 182. See id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. S.B. 538, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 185. See id.; see also Thompson, supra note 8, at 34. 
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arbitration clauses,186 which raise issues that go beyond the theoretical.187 Thus, 
Senate Bill 538 provides market-wide relief that goes beyond what antitrust law 
can provide, while strengthening federal and state incentives to enhance 
competition, such as those put into place by Covered California to encourage 
insurers to reduce costs and improve quality of care in their contracts with 
providers.188 
 
 186. S.B. 538, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). As noted above, firms with market 
power can use antitrust arbitration clauses essentially to shield anti-competitive conduct from 
antitrust scrutiny—adding arbitral requirements that procedurally and substantively disadvantage 
challenges to their market power versus what the antitrust laws themselves may provide. See 
Lemley & Leslie, supra note 90, at 41, 47. Although preemption issues under the Federal 
Arbitration Act are beyond the scope of the paper, this proposed provision may not, in fact, be 
preempted under that act. First, as far as it is one provision of a comprehensive legislative scheme 
to address alleged abuses of market power by health care systems, it does not single arbitration out 
for disparate treatment as was the case in Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark. 
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–28 (2017) (voiding a Kentucky 
Supreme Court rule preventing individual with general power of attorney from agreeing to 
arbitration clauses in contract unless the representative with that power obtained a specific waiver 
of the right to go to court and the right of trial by jury; such rulings did not put arbitration provisions 
on an equal footing with other contractual provisions or require specific waivers of other 
constitutional rights). In that sense, this proposed requirement functions as a safeguard akin to the 
unconscionability doctrine under state law; that latter doctrine of which in turn survives federal 
preemption because it focuses on whether a party lacked meaningful choice on an arbitration term 
or provision that is one-sided, rather than on whether that arbitration term or provision was more 
informal than what would obtain in court. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig. MDL 
No. 2036, 685 F.3d 1269, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2012); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 353 
P.3d 741, 748 (Cal. 2015) (unconscionability “is concerned not with a ‘simple old-fashioned bad 
bargain’ but with terms that are ‘unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party’”) (first quoting 
Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 575 (Ky. 2012); then quoting 8 
Williston on Contracts §18:10 (4th ed. 2010)); Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 741 (finding that this standard 
applies as equally to arbitration provisions as to non-arbitration provisions); see also McGill v. 
Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85, 97 (Cal. 2017) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) for the proposition that arbitration “is a matter of 
consent, not coercion”). Second, even if that provision could be viewed in isolation, it is still not 
preempted because it only addresses coerced arbitral clauses that have been effectively and 
impermissibly used to strip statutory rights set out in federal and state antitrust laws. See e.g., Am. 
Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013); id. at 2313–14 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting); McGill, 393 P.3d at 97. 
 187. See, e.g., Chad Terhune, Big California Firms Take On Health-Care Giant over Cost of 
Care, NPR (Apr. 7, 2016, 5:00 AM), www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/04/07/473253558/ 
big-california-firms-take-on-health-care-giant-over-cost-of-care (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). 
 188. In addition to the Thompson study cited above, Thompson, supra note 8, other noted health 
care economists who led a distinguished task force examining market concentration issues in health 
care have just called directly for states both to invigorate antitrust enforcement and to enact such 
laws to bring more competition into the health care sector. See Gaynor et al., supra note 11, at iii, 
2. The need for such anti-tying rules as part of a combined strategy also arose, albeit more 
indirectly, in the analysis of whether changes should be imposed to the regulatory framework 
applicable under the certificate of public advantage accorded in North Carolina to the combined 
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Assembly Bill 595 mandates that no proposed acquisition can be approved 
if it would be found anti-competitive,189 thus cementing the primacy of 
satisfying the competitive analysis required by antitrust. But it also goes beyond 
antitrust in requiring that the proponents of that acquisition also show how 
consumers would, in fact, benefit from this acquisition—as measured both by 
pricing and non-pricing metrics.190 And it allows for the institution and 
supervision of ongoing requirements as a condition for approving a proposed 
acquisition by agencies who are experts in the health care industry either to 
remedy any anti-competitive effects or to ensure pro-consumer benefits,191 a 
task that is arguably more suitable for those agencies than for the courts.  
As noted above, market studies in Massachusetts paved the way for market-
governance rules like those proposed in Senate Bill 538. Market studies paved 
the way for the successful use by antitrust public enforcers of merger laws to bar 
horizontal provider mergers and insurer mergers. Here, too, economic studies 
support the institution of California’s and Massachusetts’s efforts in market-
governance rules with respect to insurer-provider contracting is concerned. Even 
aside from examples previously discussed in this article, one study analyzing 
data from 2004 to 2013 found that in California, multi-county hospital systems 
as a system could and had charged far higher prices than other providers.192 
Another earlier study came to the same conclusion regarding California in 
comparing per-patient costs for being treated in multi-hospital systems to per-
patient costs for being treated in single hospitals.193 The findings of such anti-
competitive effects arising from the conduct of health care systems are not 
limited to California.194 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Our political system is structured to give the states an incubator role in 
instituting differing approaches to the enactment and enforcement of laws.195 
Over time, the successes and failures of these various approaches inform federal 
and state policy-making. Massachusetts served as the model for the ACA196 and 
is now serving as the touchstone for suggested legislation outside of California 
 
Mission-St. Joseph hospital system. See BOVBJERG & BERENSON, supra note 121, at 14, 15, 27 
n.18, 28 n.29. 
 189. Assemb. B. 595, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 100, at 5–6. 
 193. James C. Robinson & Kelly Miller, Total Expenditures per Patient in Hospital-Owned 
and Physician-Owned Physician Organizations in California, 312 JAMA 1666–67 (2014). 
 194. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE HEALTH FOUND., supra note 11, at 60, 62–63. 
 195. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 196. Sharon K. Long et al., Coverage, Access, and Affordability Under Health Reform: 
Learning from the Massachusetts Model, 49 INQUIRY 303, 303 (2012). 
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to remedy the anti-competitive effects of that provider conduct discussed in the 
previous section of this article.197 Looking through a wider lens, Alaska has 
experimented with a reinsurance program that has helped to safeguard insurer 
competition in that state and may be a model for other states.198  
In general, health care has been viewed as a quintessential local issue calling 
for such experimentation by such diverse sources as the U.S. Supreme Court,199 
regulations under the ACA,200 and at least one prior Republican proposal in the 
U.S. Senate allowing states freedom to keep the ACA regime if they so 
wished.201 And this role of states in experimenting with different local solutions 
that can impact federal policy-making not only involves new, market-governing 
laws, but also involves the vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws; here the states 
will continue to play integral roles in such areas as challenges to insurer and 
provider mergers.202 
Thus, what states choose to do with competition as policy reform is 
important for American health care. This article sets out how competition as 
policy within a given state need not involve just a single option such as vigorous 
antitrust enforcement. Rather, it can include a medley of options that include 
increasing not just antitrust enforcement but also incentives to encourage 
competition and market-governance rules. The states instituting such a medley 
of options to carry out competition as policy reform can substantially improve 
consumer welfare. And this combined approach is a sensible one for the 
American states in the twenty-first century for health care: it follows an approach 
 
 197. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE HEALTH FOUND., supra note 11, at 6–8, 11–12, 35–39. 
 198. See Sarah Kliff, How Alaska Fixed Obamacare, VOX.COM (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/13/15262614/obamacare-alaska-reinsurance 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
 199. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996). 
 200. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 13,406, 13,435 (Feb. 27, 2013) 
(Health Insurance Market Rules); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 
18,413, 18,417–19, 18,443 (Mar. 27, 2012) (Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health 
Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers). 
 201. See Patient Freedom Act of 2017, S. 191, 115th Cong. (2017) (“To improve patient choice 
by allowing States to adopt market-based alternatives to the Affordable Care Act that increase 
access to affordable health insurance and reduce costs while ensuring important consumer 
protections and improving patient care.”). 
 202. See Eric Kroh, Health, Pharma Sectors Will Be FTC Focus, Ohlhausen Says, LAW360 
(Mar. 31, 2017, 2:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/competition/articles/908609/health-pharma-
sectors-will-be-ftc-focus-ohlhausen-says?nl_pk=5ce9b545-d29e-40e4-a79a-5b83b95f36ff&utm_ 
source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=competition (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) 
(setting out the remarks of the chair of the antitrust task force of the National Association of 
Attorneys General that “state AGs have shown they can step up when needed.”). 
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that not only was encouraged under the Obama Administration in the U.S.203 but 
also is being undertaken more widely elsewhere.204 
 
 
 203. See Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power, supra note 4, at 1, 14; see 
also Jason Furman, Beyond Antitrust: The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Inclusive 
Growth, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 1 (Sept. 16, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de 
fault/files/page/files/20160916_searle_conference_competition_furman_cea.pdf (remarks at the 
Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy in Chicago, Illinois). 
 204. See, e.g., Yong Huang & Baiding Wu, China’s Fair Competition Review: Introduction, 
Imperfections and Solutions, COMP. POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2017, at 2, 3. 
